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An Economic Analysis of Royalty Terms
in Patent Licenses
America's reputation for ingenuity is under siege. The rate
of technological innovation' and the growth rate of economic
productivity2 not only are below their historical rates, but are
below the rates of many industrial countries. This turn of
events has sent policymakers scrambling in search of correc-
tive policies designed to restore America's lead in the develop-
ment of new technology.3
One of the most effective devices for promoting technologi-
cal innovation is the patent system. A patent grants the exclu-
sive right to make, use, and sell an invention to an inventor
who discloses the nature of the invention to the public.4 Exclu-
sive patent rights induce inventive activity because they offer
the inventor the possibility of monopoly profits 5 and prevent
1. See Arnold, Innovation and the Patent System Role in It: A Patent
Lawyer's Point of View, 8 AM. PAT. L.A.Q.J. 131, 131 (1980).
2. See C. McCoNNEL, ECONOMICS 383 (8th ed. 1981).
In the 1948-1966 period productivity-measured as output per worker
per hour-rose at an average annual rate of 3.3 percent. That figure fell
to 2.1 percent in the 1966-1973 period and then to only 1.1 percent in
1972-1978 .... Furthermore, .. . all the major industrial nations have
been experiencing more rapid productivity growth since the mid-1960s
than we have.
Id.
3. See Ginsburg, Antitrus4 Uncertainty, and Technological Innovation, 24
ANTrrRUST BuLL. 635 (1979) (present uncertainty of antitrust law chills techno-
logical innovation). An empirical study concluded that the advance of scientific
and technological knowledge accounted for 48% of the rise in output per
worker between 1929 and 1969. C. McCoNNELL, supra note 2 (citing E. DENISON,
ACCOUNTING FOR UNITED STATES ECONOMIC GROWTH, 1929-1969 at 131-37 (1974)).
See also Ewing, Innovation and Antitrust: Some thoughts on Government Pat-
ent Policy, 60 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 736, 737 (1978); Solow, Technical Change and
the Aggregate Production Function, 39 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 312 (1957).
4. The Constitution speaks of an "exclusive right" of inventors to their in-
ventions for a limited period of time, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, but the patent
statute actually grants "the right to exclude others from making, using, or sell-
ing [an] invention." 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1976).
5. A patentee is a monopolist in the sense that no one else may sell the
patented invention without permission. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1976). But a mo-
nopoly position does not guarantee substantial profits. If there is no demand
for the invention, there will be no profit. If there are close substitutes for the
invention then, according to the theory of monopolistic competition, monopoly
power is attenuated and profits will be no larger than normal. See generally E.
CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETION: A RE-ORIENTATION
OF THE THEORY OF VALUE (8th ed. 1962); J. WnsON & S. DARR, MANAGERIAL Eco-
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competitors from freely appropriating the fruits of his or her re-
search and development (R & D) expenditures.6 The patent
system thereby promotes the diffusion of new ideas, while cre-
ating an incentive for R & D.7 The effectiveness of this incen-
tive, however, depends upon the scope of patent protection,8
the difficulty of obtaining a patent,9 and the potential right of
patentees to dispose of all or part of their patent rights.O
NOMICS: CONCEPTS, APPUCATIONS, AND CASES 297-301 (1979) (monopolistically
competitive industry will attract new firms, causing each firm's market share to
decrease until average revenue is equal to average cost). Thus, it is unusual for
a patent monopoly to ripen into an economic monopoly. Hammond & Medlock,
Lessons Learned from Recent Licensing Cases, in 2 TECHNOLOGY LICENSING 171
(T. Arnold & T. Smegal eds. 1982). In fact a survey of U.S. licensors found that
they enjoy monopoly positions in only 27% of the cases, face two to five rivals
in 34% of the cases, and more than five rivals in 39% of the cases. Caves,
Crookell & Killing, The Imperfect Market for Technology Licenses, in HARv.
INST. FOR ECON. RESEARCH 2 (No. 903, 1982) (citing F. CONTRACTOR, INTERNA-
TIONAL TECHNOLOGY LICENSING: COMPENSATION, COSTS, AND NEGOTIATION 112
(1981)).
6. "[W]hoever without authority makes, uses or sells any patented inven-
tion ... infringes the patent." 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1976). A patentee may enjoin
infringement, id. § 283, or collect damages, id. § 284, to prevent appropriation of
an invention.
7. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). See also Preci-
sion Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806,
815-16 (1945); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp. 645 F.2d 1195, 1203 (2d Cir. 1981) (pub-
lic benefits from patents include disclosure of inventions, exploitation of inven-
tions, and increased competition in the market place), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
1016 (1982). But see Turner, Patents, Antitrust and Invention, U. Prrr. L. REV.
151, 152 (1976) (patent system inhibits research in areas with many existing
patents and increases costs by shutting off most promising avenue of solving a
particular problem).
8. The scope of patent protection is measured by the size of the market
that a patentee is entitled to monopolize. This concept is similar to the prob-
lem of defining markets in antitrust cases. In the latter instance, identical
products and very close substitutes constitute a market. The difficulty lies in
measuring substitutability, and deciding how closely the substitute must mir-
ror the product under consideration. See I_ SuLLxvAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw
OF ANTITRuST § 12 (1979). In patent law the scope of patent protection extends
to identical products and their functional equivalents, i.e., substitutes. P. Ro-
SENBERG, PATENT LAw FUNDAmENTALS §§ 17.07-.07(1) (1980). One commentator
recommends that the courts not attempt to adjust the scope of patent protec-
tion because they lack the expertise. W. BOwMAN, PATENT AND ANTrrRUST LAw
51-52 (1973). In theory, a court cannot enlarge a patent beyond the scope of its
claims as allowed by the Patent Office. Keystone Bridge Co. v. Phoenix Iron
Co., 95 U.S. 274, 278 (1877). In practice, however, claims are not construed liter-
ally. See, e.g., Merry Mfg. Co. v. Burns Tool Co., 335 F.2d 239, 244 (5th Cir. 1964)
("patent construction is seldom a matter of pure literalism").
9. The courts can affect the probability of patent approval by altering the
interpretation of patentability requirements. See infra text accompanying
notes 99, 102, 111.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 22-94. This Note deals primarily
with the judicial attitude toward licensing of patent rights. Judicial treatment
of patent scope and patentability standards are only discussed incidentally.
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Economic factors such as potential monopoly profit and the
risk" of innovation are primary determinants of the level of R
& D expenditure.12 The popular notion of the lone inventor dis-
covering an invention during a flash of genius is not a realistic
model of most innovation.'3 Rather, discoveries are generally
the culmination of sustained efforts by organized research
groups, usually big corporations with institutionalized R & D
staffs.14 As their R & D budgets grow, so does their output of
inventions.' 5 In the aggregate, the level of R & D expenditure is
positively correlated with the rate of innovation.' 6
Efficient exploitation of a patent often requires patentees
to license users of their inventions. 7 The courts, on the other
hand, have proscribed many forms of license agreements 8 and
11. Risk discourages innovation. See infra text accompanying notes 168-
206. See also SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 463 F. Supp. 983, 1013-14 (D. Conn.
1978), remanded on other grounds, 599 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1979) (the court was con-
cerned about uncertainty in fashioning relief, since uncertainty is crucial to R &
D plans); Arnold, supra note 1, at 137-40 (uncertainty is the most significant de-
terrent to R & D); Arnold, Aspelund, Brantley & Shurn, An Overview of U.S. An-
titrust and Misuse Law for Licensors and Licensees, in 1 TECHNOLOGY
LICENSING 43, 157 (T. Arnold & T. Smegal eds. 1982) ("If there are no certainties
in the law of antitrust as applied to licensing of intellectual property,. . . would
it surprise anybody that licensing diminishes-to the detriment of competi-
tion?"); Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An
Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267, 268 (1966) (invention is a risky economic
activity); Ewing, supra note 3, at 737 (innovation is a relatively high risk enter-
prise); Ginsburg,'supra note 3, at 684-86 (uncertainty crucially affects R & D de-
cisions); Stedman, Acquisition of Patents and Know-How by Grant Fraud,
Purchase and Grant-back, 28 U. Prrr. LI REV. 161, 163 (1967) (describing an IBM
research venture as a $5 billion gamble); Udell, To Promote the Progress of Sci-
ence and Useful Arts: Public Law and Technological Innovation, 19 IDEA 285,
289 (1977) ('The high cost and risk of innovation has caused many firms to re-
duce their R & D activity ... .").
12. See generally J. SCHMOOKLER, PATENTS, INVENTION AND ECONOMIC
CHANGE 47-59, 70-84 (1972) (Technological change is substantially affected by
economic variables; in particular, the level of inventive activity in an industry is
correlated to demand for the industry's product.). See also J. ScmsOOKIR, IN-
VENTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 196-215 (1966).
13. See W. BowmAN, supra note 8, at 36; J. GALRArriH, AMERICAN CAPITAL-
ISM 86-87 (rev. ed. 1956).
14. See J. PARKER, THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION: THE NATIONAL AND
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE IN TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 29-35 (2d ed. 1978). In
1900, 18% of patents were received by corporations, compared to 63% in 1960.
Id. at 35.
15. Kamien & Schwartz, Market Structure and Innovation: A Survey, 13 J.
EcoN. LrrERATuRE 1, 5 (1975).
16. Id. Since technological progress is one of the chief sources of economic
growth, changes in the level of R & D and the rate of innovation have a signifi-
cant impact on economic growth. See supra note 3.
17. See infra note 22.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 22-94.
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discouraged patent licensing in general,19 thereby diminishing
the efficacy of the patent system as a stimulus to R & D. This
negative attitude is attributable to fears that licensing will be
used to protect invalid patents20 and secure illegitimate exten-
sions of monopoly power.2 1 Part I of this Note reviews judicial
treatment of certain royalty terms in patent licenses, describing
the restraints the courts have imposed on the freedom of pat-
entees to license their patents. Part II criticizes the reasoning
and economic analysis behind the judicial restraints on licens-
ing. This Part contends that the danger that royalty terms in
patent licenses will be used to protect invalid patents or extend
the scope of the patent monopoly has been exaggerated. Part
III of this Note, therefore, proposes a new mode of analyzing
royalty terms in patent licenses, whereby courts would balance
the potential harms of particular royalty terms against their
economic benefits.
I. A REVIEW OF ROYALTY TERMS IN PATENT
LICENSING AGREEMENTS
A. THE THREAT OF ANTICOMPETITIVE LICENSE TERMS
Whether a patentee chooses to license an invention or to
develop and market the invention as a monopolist 22 depends on
the profitability of the two alternatives. One factor influencing
the profitability of licensing is the ability of the licensor to de-
sign a schedule of royalty payments from licensees that fully
captures the profits of the patent monopoly to which a patentee
is entitled.23 If an effective plan for securing patent profits
through royalty payments cannot be devised, patentees will
19. See id.
20. See infra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 48-57.
22. Once a patentee licenses other firms to manufacture and sell an inven-
tion, the patentee is no longer a monopolist in the market for the invention. A
patentee can assign each licensee a geographical territory or a technological
field of use of the invention, however, thereby segmenting the market for an in-
vention and making each licensee a monopolist in a submarket. See, e.g., In-
dustrial Mach. Tool Co. v. Miami Window Corp., 234 F.2d 301, 304 (5th Cir. 1956)
(territorial restriction); Brownell v. Ketcham Wire & Mfg. Co., 211 F.2d 121, 128
(9th Cir. 1954) (territorial restriction); General Talking Pictures Corp. v. West-
ern Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, 179 (field of use restriction), affd on reh'g, 305 U.S.
124, 127 (1930).
A patentee is not required to license competitors. SCM Corp. v. Xerox
Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1204 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982); W.I
Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Carlisle Corp., 529 F.2d 614, 623 (3d Cir. 1976). The deci-
sion whether to license an invention depends solely on the profitability of that
option.
23. For a discussion of the difficulty of valuing an invention and establish-
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tend to favor exclusive use instead of licensing; that is, they
will be more likely to develop and market an invention as a mo-
nopolist.24 To promote the widest possible dissemination of
new ideas, including patented inventions,25 patent law should
encourage inventors to license others to use their inventions by
granting patentees considerable freedom in establishing effec-
tive methods of collecting royalty payments.
Admittedly, licensing can create undeserved profits when
used in connection with an invalid patent or as part of an illegal
scheme to extend the patent monopoly. The problem of
wrongly awarded, or invalid, patents partially stems from the
huge volume of patent applications submitted to a decidedly
understaffed Patent and Trademark Office.26 The courts are ap-
propriately concerned about the risk of illegitimate patent
grants, and their careful scrutiny of licenses potentially protect-
ing invalid patents is justified.27 The other anticompetitive ef-
fect of licensing frequently cited by courts,28 namely the
extension of the patent monopoly, arises because inventions,
and the right to their exclusive use, often provide substantial
economic power.29 The patented invention may provide lever-
age for a firm to gain an unfair advantage in another market,3 0
ing royalty payment schedules in patent licenses, see infra note 192 and accom-
panying text.
Several other factors influence the profitability of licensing. Often licen-
sees can produce or market an invention more efficiently than the patentee.
See infra text accompanying notes 163-67. A patentee may not have the pro-
ductive facilities to satisfy demand for a successful invention. See infra text ac-
companying notes 165-66. On the other hand, exclusive use of an invention is
desirable because the patentee retains firm control over the price and quantity
of the invention sold. Licensees may undercut the monopoly price the licensor
desires. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
24. Some patentees have no choice but to license; for example, if the in-
ventor lacks the productive capacity to satisfy demand, and cannot easily ex-
pand capacity, then the patentee will choose to license in spite of difficulties in
collecting royalties. In this case, judicial limitations on methods of collecting
royalties reduce the profit of the licensor, and diminish the incentive to
innovate.
25. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231-32 (1964);
Compco Co. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964) (emphasizing
federal patent policy of public access to unpatentable articles).
26. The Patent Office seldom rejects an application if an inventor is persis-
tent; hence, many questionable patents have been granted. See Duplan Corp.
v. Deering Miliken, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 648, 750 (D.S.C. 1977), modified on other
grounds, 594 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1979).
27. See infra text accompanying notes 38-47.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 48-57.
29. W. BowMAN, supra note 8, at 54.
30. The economic power of the patent can be exploited in an arrangement
called a tying agreement. In a tying agreement, the tying product (in this case
the patented invention) is made available to the contracting party only if that
[Vol. 67:11981202
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as well as the means to coerce licensees to accept unreasonable
agreements. 31
Economists find that anticompetitive business practices,
such as invalid patents and illegally extended patent monopo-
lies, are "allocatively inefficient"3 2 in terms of where resources
are placed in the economy as a result of such practices, and
how that placement corresponds to consumer values.33 Com-
petitive markets are generally favored because such markets
produce the variety and quantity of goods wanted by consum-
party agrees to buy another product, the tied product, from the patentee. Tying
is illegal if the patentee possesses economic power in the market for the tying
good, and the tying arrangement results in an appreciable restraint of free com-
petition in the market for the tied good. See Northern Pacific Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958). "Nowhere has the Supreme Court held, in a tie-in
case involving a patented tying product, that the economic power of leverage to
coerce a tie-in, as required by Northern Pacific, may be presumed from the
existence of the patent." Lowin, Whether Patented or Unpatented: A Question
of the Economic Leverage of Patents to Coerce Tie-ins, 23 IDEA 77, 101 (1982)
(emphasis deleted). But showing that leverage exists in the market for the pat-
ented good is not difficult. See, e.g., Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314
U.S. 488, 491 (1942) (respondent conditioned access to patented invention
purchase of unpatented good from licensor).
Tying is per se illegal if the court finds separate products tied, and
legal if the court is persuaded that the two items are a single integrated
whole to such a degree that it is unreasonable to treat the transaction
as an illegal tie .... Tying is equally illegal when the "tying product"
is a license under a patent which is granted only on condition of some
staple commodity "tied product" being purchased from the patent
owner.
Arnold, Aspelund, Brantley & Shurn, supra note 11, at 102-03 (emphasis in
original).
31. Courts may find that coercion of a licensee constitutes an antitrust vio-
lation. For example, coercion to enter into a tying agreement would constitute
such a violation. See supra note 30. Courts also refuse to enforce unfair licens-
ing agreements by invoking the doctrine of patent misuse. Misuse is either a
violation of the antitrust laws or an otherwise unreasonable restraint of trade
outside the scope of the patent. Arnold, Aspelund, Brantley & Schurn, supra
note 11, at 48. Relying on the equitable doctrine of unclean hands, courts re-
fuse to enjoin infringement of a misused patent, see, e.g., United States Gyp-
sum Co. v. National Gypsum Corp., 352 U.S. 457, 465 (1957); Morton Salt Co. v.
G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 502 (1942), even if the misuse did not affect the
infringer. Arnold, Aspelund, Brantley & Schurn, supra note 11, at 48. The
courts rely upon the per se and rule of reason standards applicable in antitrust
litigation in determining whether there has been patent misuse. See Moraine
Prods. v. ICI America, Inc., 538 F.2d 134, 144 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 941
(1976).
Misuse can be purged if the patentee refrains from the offensive behavior
for a sufficient period of time. Arnold, Aspelund, Brantley & Shurn, supra note
11, at 147-51; Dieterich, Antitrust Issues in the Developmen4 Acquisition and Li-
censing of Industrial Property Rights, in 1 TECHNOLOGY LICENSING 238 (T. Ar-
nold & T. Smegal eds. 1982).
32. See infra note 34.
33. R. BoRK, TuE ANTIRUST PARADox 91 (1978). See also F. ScHERER, IN-
DUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 16-18 (1980).
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ers.34 Monopolies, on the other hand, are generally disfavored
because they restrict supply, causing the ultimate congregation
of goods to deviate from that desired by consumers.3 5 Society,
however, has chosen to forgo the allocative efficiency of com-
petitive markets in granting patentees monopolies in order to
encourage inventive effort.36 Nevertheless, courts have been
hesitant to accept the allocative distortion caused by the patent
monopoly when it comes to patent licensing.37
B. THE STARTING PoINT: LEAR AND BRULOTTE
The Supreme Court first considered the possibility that the
royalty terms of a patent license might protect an invalid pat-
ent, and consequently cause allocative inefficiency, in Lear, Inc.
v. Adkins.38 In 1952, Lear hired Adkins to solve gyroscope de-
velopment problems, with Adkins agreeing to grant a license to
Lear on any such invention "on a mutually satisfactory royalty
basis." 39 Adkins invented an improved gyroscope and filed a
patent application in 1954.40 After six years and several rejec-
tions, the patent was finally approved.41 Meanwhile, in 1955,
the royalty terms of the license were agreed upon, providing
that if "such a patent so issued is subsequently held invalid
... Lear at its option shall have the right forthwith to termi-
34. Profit maximizing firms in a competitive market set price equal to mar-
ginal cost. This means that resources are efficiently allocated. This judgment
is based on the assumptions that product price measures the benefit to society
from an additional unit of a good, and marginal cost measures the cost of an
additional good. So the equality of price and marginal cost implies that a com-
petitive market selects an output such that the value of the last unit produced
is equal to the value of the alternative goods sacrified by its production. C. Mc-
CoNNELL, supra note 2, at 528-30.
35. The distinctive feature of the monopoly situation is that the mo-
nopolist has created a gap between marginal cost and price, which
means that social costs and social desires are no longer equated. In-
deed, the monopolist has made his monopoly profit by creating an im-
balance between cost and desire. With the restriction in output,
moreover, the widget industry no longer needs as many resources as
before. The unneeded resources must either lie idle, an obvious social
waste, or migrate to other industries where the value of their marginal
product will be less than it would be in the monopolized widget indus-
try. The result, of course, is that they contribute less wealth as con-
sumers define wealth, so that consumers would be better off if these
resources could return to making widgets.
R. BoaR, supra note 33, at 101. See also F. SCHERER, upra note 33, at 16.
36. See supra note 7.
37. See infra text accompanying notes 38-57.
38. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
39. Id. at 657.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 660.
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nate the specific license so affected." 42 In 1957, Lear claimed
that a Patent Office Search disclosed a patent which fully antic-
ipated Adkins discovery, so that Lear was no longer obligated
to make royalty payments. Adkins sued Lear when the latter
discontinued the royalty payments called for by the license
agreement. 4 3 Notwithstanding the agreement requiring Lear to
pay royalties until the patent had been declared invalid, the
Supreme Court held that Lear could avoid all royalty payments
accruing since the patent issued regardless of when the patent
was declared invalid.44
The Lear Court resolved the conflict between federal pat-
ent law and state contract law in favor of federal law, enunciat-
ing a policy designed to protect the integrity of the patent
system.45 Consistent with this goal, the Court sought to pro-
vide licensees with an economic incentive to challenge ques-
tionable patent grants.4 6 Harlan noted that "[f1]icensees may
often be the only individuals with enough economic incentive
to challenge the patentability of an inventor's discovery. If
they are muzzled, the public may continually be required to
pay tribute to would-be monopolists without need or justifica-
tion."47 Essentially, Harlan expressed concern that patent
licenses like the one in Lear protect invalid patents, creating
allocative inefficiency.
In addition, courts scrutinize patent licenses to guard
against a second source of allocative inefficiency: the illegal ex-
tension of the patent monopoly. License agreements requiring
royalty payments after the expiration of the patent pose the
threat of extending the scope of the patent monopoly. In Bru-
lotte v. Thys Co.,48 the Supreme Court considered such an
agreement, in which licensees purchased patented farm equip-
42. Id. at 657.
43. Id. at 660. Lear had two factories using the invention. One of the facto-
ries ended royalty payments in 1957, and the other in 1959. Id. at 659-60.
44. Id. at 673-74. The Court referred Adkin's claim for royalties accruing
before the 1960 patent issue to the state court. Id. at 675.
The Court also struck down the doctrine of licensee estoppel. Id. at 668-71.
Before Lear, licensees were barred from challenging the validity of the licensed
patent in litigation. Id. at 656.
45. "[E]nforcing this contractual provision would undermine the strong
federal policy favoring the full and free use of ideas in the public domain." Id.
at 674.
46. The Court felt that freeing licensees from the liability of royalty pay-
ments would provide an incentive to challenge possibly illegitimate patents.
Id.
47. Id. at 670.
48. 379 U.S. 29 (1964).
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ment and obtained a use license from the patentee. The licens-
ing agreement required minimum annual royalty payments of
$500 for a term exceeding the term of all of the several patents
covering the machine. The license also prevented assignment
and removal of the machines from their original location. 49
Brulotte highlights the conflict between the patentee's de-
sire to use a convenient form of royalty payment 0 and the
Court's suspicion that the purpose and effect of the license was
to create monopoly profits in excess of those authorized by the
patent grant.Sl The lower court had held that the period of roy-
alty payment provided "a reasonable amount of time over
which to spread the payments for the use of the patent."5 2 Jus-
tice Douglas disagreed, contending that the restriction on as-
signment and movement of the machines after expiration of the
patent period was "a telltale sign that the licensor was using
the licenses to project its monopoly beyond the patent pe-
riod."53 The Court, therefore, disallowed the royalty payments
accruing after the patents expired,5 4 reasoning that the licensor
made "a bald attempt to exact the same terms and conditions
for the period after the patents have expired as [it did] for the
monopoly period."55 Finding the licensing arrangement similar
to a tie,5 6 the Court declared it per se illegal.5 7
C. ANTICOMPETrIVE CONCERNS IN LICENSING CASES AFrER
LEAR AND BRULOTTE
Using Lear and Brulotte as benchmarks, courts have scruti-
nized other licensing agreements with mixed results. The li-
censing of patent applications is generally permitted, 8 but
contracts requiring royalty payments on invalid patents are
not.5 9 Often settlement agreements ending patent infringement
49. Id. at 29.
50. Id. at 31.
51. Id. at 32.
52. Id. at 31 (quoting Thys Co. v. Brulotte, 62 Wash. 2d 284, 291, 382 P.2d
271, 275 (1963)). Justice Douglas did not deny this argument; apparently he be-
lieved the threat of monopoly profits outweighed this benefit. 379 U.S. at 31.
53. 379 U.S. at 32.
54. Id. at 33-34.
55. Id. at 32.
56. Id at 33. See supra note 30 for a discussion of tying.
57. 379 U.S. at 32. A licensor may require the payment of a lump sum roy-
alty to be spread over a term of years beyond the life of the patent. Coast Met-
als, Inc. v. Cape, 205 U.S.P.Q. 154, 157 (D.N.J. 1979); Huyck Corp. v. Algany Int'l
Corp., 193 U.S.P.Q. 200, 202 (M.D. Ala. 1977).
58. See infra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
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and patent validity litigation are not enforceable.60 Finally, the
licensing of a package of patents is not allowed if the licensee
was forced to accept unwanted patents.61
The seminal case regarding application licensing is Aron-
son v. Quick Point Pencil Co.62 Aronson involved a contract
whereby a manufacturer, Quick Point, agreed to pay a royalty
of five percent of the selling price of an invention. The contract
provided, however, that if the invention was not patented
within five years, the royalty would be reduced to 2.5%. Ap-
proval did not occur within the designated five years, and the
patent was ultimately rejected. After paying the 2.5% royalty
for a number of years, Quick Point sought a declaratory judg-
ment that the agreement was unenforceable under Lear and
Brulotte .63
The Aronson Court, in permitting enforcement of the
agreement, found Lear inapposite since no ideas were with-
drawn from public use.64 Any competitor of Quick Point was
free to manufacture and sell the invention. Furthermore, the
Court reasoned, Quick Point benefited from the confidential
disclosure of a trade secret.65 If a licensor such as Aronson
were not assured the same protection as the licensor of a trade
secret, inventors would generally be discouraged from patent-
ing.66 Moreover, the leverage analysis of Brulotte did not dis-
able Aronson's licensing agreement,67 despite Quick Point's
assertion that Aronson relied on the economic value of the pat-
ent application to obtain monopoly profits on an invention that
was not patentable.68 The Court agreed that patent applica-
60. See infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 82-94 and accompanying text.
62. 440 U.S. 257 (1978).
63. Id. at 260.
64. Id. at 264.
65. An inventor may forgo patent protection and license an invention as a
trade secret. See, e.g., Warner-Lambert Pharmaceutical Co. v. John J. Reyn-
olds, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (product formula protected as a trade
secret rather than by a patent), affd per curiam 280 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1960). Al-
though a licensor may obtain royalty payments for an indefinite period, see id.
at 660-63, trade secrets are usually less valuable than patented inventions, since
the licensor does not have a right to exclude independent inventors, or copiers,
see id. at 665.
66. See Aronson, 440 U.S. at 267 (Blackaun, J., concurring). As demon-
strated by the Aronson license, it is often most convenient for both parties to
package trade secrets and application licenses together. Proscribing applica-
tion licenses would preclude this possibility. Altman, A Quick Point Regarding
Perpetual Trade Secret Royalty Liability, 61 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 510, 532 (1979).
67. 440 U.S. at 264. But see Reich v. Reed Tool Co., 203 U.S.P.Q. 288 (1980)
(patent application misused by tying arrangement).
68. See 440 U.S. at 265-66.
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tions provide inventors with bargaining power,69 but noted that
such power depends on the parties' assessment of the likeli-
hood of patent approval.70 In this case, the parties were fully
aware of the pendency of the application and the significant
probability that it would not be approved. Quick Point placed a
substantial value on exploiting the novelty of the device even if
no patent issued.7 1 Hence, the Court concluded that the sched-
ule of royalty payments, "far from being negotiated 'with the
leverage' of a patent, rested instead on the contingency that no
patent would issue within five years." 72
Licenses requiring royalty payments after a finding of pat-
ent invalidity are analytically similar to application licensing.
Licensees who successfully challenge a patent are in a position
much like Quick Point's. They are beneficiaries of a protected
market position by virtue of their licenses,73 which enables
them to benefit from the patentee's research. This problem
was considered in a 1980 district court case, Grunewald v.
Power Swing Partners.74 The license in that case provided that
if the patent were ever found invalid, the minimum annual roy-
alty would be reduced by one-half.75 The court, finding the
agreement invalid, recognized that the reduced royalty provi-
sion provided some incentive to challenge the validity of the
patent, but concluded that any postvalidity royalty undermines
the goal of Lear, namely, protecting the public from invalid pat-
ent monopolies.7 6
Courts have also applied the rationale of Lear to negate
69. Id. at 265.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 261-62.
72. Id. at 265. The Court in Aronson "refused to assume without proof that
the mere potential for patent protection would provide enough leverage for the
licensor to coerce the licensee into accepting indefinite trade secret royalty lia-
bility... ." Altman, Is There an Afterlife? The Effect of Patent or Copyright
Expiration on License Agreements, 64 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 297, 316-17 (1982) (em-
phasis in original).
73. Getting a head start in an industry created by an invention can be in-
valuable. "Quick Point was able to preempt the market in the earlier years and
was long the only manufacturer of the Aronson keyholder ... ." 440 U.S. at
260. See also Hammond & Medlock, supra note 5, at 183 (the original manufac-
turer of a new product has a lead time enabling that manufacturer to capture a
greater market share); Hill, The Licensing of Patent Applications: Legal and
Competitive Effects, 63 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 483, 501 (1981) (a patent application
licensee "bargains for a head start in the market by which it can obtain an ad-
vantage over competitors"). The former licensee of an invalid patent will also
have a head start over nonlicensed competitors.
74. 9 Bankr. 512 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980).
75. Id. at 516.
76. Id. at 520.
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certain settlement agreements. Often a patentee and an al-
leged infringer will negotiate a license as part of a settlement
agreement.77 Such licenses are inherently inconsistent with
the rationale of Lear,7 8 which disfavors licensing agreements
that deter patent challenges. Since settlement agreements by
their very nature avoid patent litigation, courts will carefully
scrutinize any included license provision under the Lear doc-
trine. The courts, however, are divided on the resolution of this
conflict.7 9 Some praise settlements as an efficient means of
resolving disputes and therefore enforce settlement licenses
fully,80 while an equal number decry settlement licenses be-
cause of their ability to protect invalid patents.8'
Whereas the goal of the Lear Court was to protect the pub-
lic from monopolies created by invalid patents, the goal of the
Brulotte Court was to restrain legitimate patentees from ob-
taining monopoly profits beyond the bounds of the patent
grant. In deference to the Brulotte opinion, courts have ana-
lyzed package licenses, or licenses covering multiple patents, to
guard against any illegal extension of monopoly power.8 2 Spe-
cifically, if a licensee is coerced into accepting an unwanted
patent in order to obtain a desired patent, then the package
may be considered an illegal tying arrangement, with the de-
77. E. LovEL, DOMESTIC LICENSING PRACTICES 10-11 (Experiences in Mar-
keting Management, No. 18, 1968).
78. Rocform Corp. v. Acitelli-Standard Concrete Wall, Inc., 168 U.S.P.Q. 51,
53 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (An agreement not to contest the validity of a patent as part
of a settlement agreement is not enforceable. The agreement presents a con-
flict between the policy favoring settlement versus the policy calling for the ful-
lest possible litigation of validity. The latter must prevail.).
79. See generally Comment, The Enforceability of Patent Settlement Agree-
ments After Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 48 U. Cm. L REV. 715 (1982) (arguing that pat-
ent settlement agreements should be enforced by their terms).
80. See, e.g., Speed Shore Corp. v. Denda, 203 U.S.P.Q. 807, 811 (9th Cir.
1979) (settlement of patent litigation is favored if validity is not an issue);
Rausburg Electro Coating Corp. v. Spiller & Spiller, Inc., 489 F.2d 974, 978 (7th
Cir. 1973) (applying Lear would strip good faith settlement of any meaning);
Pet Inc. v. Kysor Indus. Corp., 193 U.S.P.Q. 492, 496 (W.D. Mich. 1975) (cross-
agreements not to sue for infringement and not to alter production in the direc-
tion of the other's product is permissible); Schlegel Mfg. Co. v. King Aluminum
Corp., 381 F. Supp. 649, 655 (S.D. Ohio 1974) (judicial economy is more impor-
tant than the concerns of Lear).
81. See, e.g., United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 197 (1963) (set-
tlement of the issue of validity is not permitted); Standard Sanitary Mig. Co. v.
United States, 226 U.S. 20, 49 (1912) (if the agreement itself exceeds what is
necessary to protect the patent rights it may violate the antitrust laws); Crane
Corp. v. Aeroquip Corp., 504 F.2d 1086, 1092 (7th Cir. 1974) (a licensee may test
the validity of a patent after entering into a consent judgment of validity).
82. See, e.g., Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Dev. Corp., 433 F.2d
55, 61 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 976 (1971).
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sired patent constituting the tying product and the unwanted
patent the tied product.83
Mobil Oil Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 8 4 a 1973 district court
case, involved a package license in which Mobil offered W.R.
Grace a defined field license85 at an 8.4% annual royalty rate, or
a package of five specific patents at a seven percent annual roy-
alty rate.86 W.R. Grace claimed that a mere 1.4% gap between
the two royalty rates constituted evidence of tying.87 The court
rejected this argument, however, observing that uncertainty
about the scope of the five patents would make enforcement of
Mobil's rights against infringers costly and difficult,88 the
greater enforcement cost was passed along to W.R. Grace in the
seven percent royalty rate, and the small gap between royalty
rates simply reflected the cost advantage of the defined field
license.89
Package licenses often involve the issue of postexpiration
royalties as well.90 Although the patents in a package typically
have different expiration dates, license agreements usually call
for continued royalty payments despite the expiration of some
83. See Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 648, 696 (D.S.C.
1977) (compulsory package licensing constitutes illegal tying), affid in part,
rev'd on other grounds, 594 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015
(1980); Arnold, Aspelund, Brantley & Shurn, supra note 11, at 130 (compulsory
package licenses are not permitted).
Total sales is an acceptable base for royalty payments regardless of
whether the entire product is covered by a patent, as long as the arrangement
is for the mutual convenience of the parties. Dieterich, supra note 31, at 189,
252. But neither party may insist on royalty payments based on a formula not
reasonably related to licensee use. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research,
Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 139-40 (1969).
84. 180 U.S.P.Q. 418 (D. Conn. 1973).
85. A defined field license is an agreement that the patentee will not chal-
lenge activities in a particular area of technical interest to the licensees under
any patent. See P. ROSENnERG, supra note 8, § 16.01(2) (c).
86. 180 U.S.P.Q. at 420.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 425.
89. Id. Package licenses may also be challenged under the Lear doctrine.
In Timely Products, Inc. v. Costanzo, 465 F. Supp. 91 (D. Conn. 1979), a license
covered trade secrets, knowhow, and a patent. Id. at 94. The agreement did not
include a provision reducing royalties in the event that the patent was found
invalid. Id. The agreement was held unenforceable since no incentive existed
for a licensee to challenge patent validity. Id. at 99.
90. See, e.g., American Sec. Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769,
777 (3d Cir.) (license invalid where no reduction in royalties as patents in a
mandatory package expired), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 902 (1959); Congoleum In-
dus., Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 180 U.S.P.Q. 264, 271-72 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (license
on knowhow and a patent application did not violate Brulotte by extending the
patent right before the grant).
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of the patents.9 1 Courts have examined these agreements for
violations of the Brulotte rule against postexpiration royalties,
as well as for violations of the prohibition against mandatory
package licensing. The Sixth Circuit found a license based on
several patents with different expiration dates invalid because
royalty rates did not decrease as the patents expired.9 2 On the
other hand, the Seventh Circuit, emphasizing that the agree-
ment was voluntarily entered into, upheld a similar license.93
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit has upheld license agreements in-
volving multiple patents with differing expiration dates, al-
though these agreements apparently called for a reduction in
royalty payments as each patent expired.94
I. ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY LOSSES FROM INVALID
PATENTS AND PATENT LEVERAGING
Courts reviewing patent licenses for anticompetitive ten-
dencies have adopted an overly simplistic mode of economic
analysis. Although noting possible sources of allocative distor-
tion, they fail to quantify the distortion or to balance any possi-
ble gains in productive efficiency resulting from a given license.
Close examination of standard patent agreements, the judicial
fears they engender, and their overall economic effect on indus-
try demonstrate the need for a new approach to restrictive pat-
ent licensing.
Assuming that settlement agreements and royalty pay-
ments on invalid patents do offer substantial protection to inva-
lid patents, and that postexpiration and package licensing can
extend the patent monopoly, the allocative distortion caused by
these practices is probably not very large. Because these prac-
91. See, e.g., Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Dev. Corp., 433 F.2d
55, 60 (7th Cir. 1970) (royalties required until last patent expired), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 976 (1971); American Sec. Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769,
771 (3d Cir.) (mandatory package license with royalties independent of patents
used), cert denied 361 U.S. 902 (1959).
92. Rocform Corp. v. Acitelli-Standard Concrete Wall, Inc., 367 F.2d 678, 681
(6th Cir. 1971).
93. Beckman Instruments v. Technical Dev. Corp., 433 F.2d 55, 61 (7th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 976 (1971). See also Mobil Oil Corp. v. W.R. Grace &
Co., 180 U.S.P.Q. 418, 453 (D. Conn. 1973); Finnegan v. Spiegl Farms, Inc., 234
Cal. App. 2d 408, 410, 44 Cal. Rptr. 645, 646-47 (1965) (licensing agreement involv-
ing five patents and a patent application does not extend beyond the life of the
patents, in spite of the patent application).
94. See Western Elec. Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 631 F.2d 333, 340 (4th
Cir. 1980); Compton v. Metal Products, Inc., 453 F.2d 38, 46 (4th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 968 (1975).
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tices make patent licensing more profitable,95 they can, how-
ever, increase the rate of patent licensing relative to exclusive
use.96 Licensing may reduce the allocative distortion caused by
the patent grant, since licensing is likely to make the pos-
texpiration market for the patented invention more competi-
tive.9 7 In addition, monopoly restrictions are more difficult to
maintain if the patented invention is licensed rather than lim-
ited to the exclusive use of the patentee; licensees have an in-
centive to cheat on the monoply restrictions, and any cheating
will reduce the allocative distortion.9 8
A. THE PROTECTION OF INVALD PATENTS BY LICENSE
AGREEMENTS
The Lear doctrine bespeaks a concern that patent licenses
may discourage or prevent licensees from challenging the li-
censed patent, thus insulating invalid patents from litigation.
Although this concern is valid, it usually does not justify invali-
dating otherwise legitimate methods of obtaining royalty pay-
ments. Generally, if the potential monopoly profit from an
invalid patent is large, nonlicensed parties with the ability and
incentive to challenge the patent will exist.
As a first step in this reasoning, consider that there are
four sources of patent invalidity-the negatives of the standard
95. A more efficient means of collecting royalty payments leads to lower
possible costs and greater interbrand competition. Andewelt, Technology Li-
censing and Antitrust Laws--The View from the Department of Justice, in 1
TECHNOLOGY LICENSING 401, 412-13 (1982).
96. See supra text accompanying notes 22-25.
97. Absent licensing, competition with the patentee can be delayed after
expiration of the patent, because new producers and users of the invention face
start-up costs and lead time before they can effectively compete. See F. SCHER-
ER, supra note 33, at 236. See also American Photocopy Equip. Co. v. Rovica,
Inc., 257 F. Supp. 192, 199 (N.D. Ill. 1966) ("Where a patentee is certainly free
not to license at all, we fail to see how competition is restrained by charging
high royalties. Indeed, such licensing, if not beyond the scope of the patent
grant, should be encouraged under anti-trust principles, as an alternative to
monoply, which would otherwise be present."), afd, 384 F.2d 813 (7th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 945 (1968); C. McCowNmu., supra note 2, at 667 ("In-
novation can weaken and undermine existing positions of monoply power
.); Andewelt, supra note 95, at 405-06 ('To the extent that antitrust en-
forcement restrains exploitation of the technology, the total amount of innova-
tion in the economy could decrease, and competition in the marketplace could
be adversely affected.").
98. A licensee has an incentive to violate license restrictions designed to
assure the licensor monopoly profits, by cutting the price below the monopoly
price and expanding output. A cheating licensee profits at the expense of the
licensor and other licensees, but consumers benefit from reduced prices and
expanded output. Cf. W. NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 312-17 (1972)
(cheating is attractive to individual firms, but reduces industry profits).
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of patentability. An invention is patentable if it is new, useful,
and nonobvious; moreover, the applicant must be the first in-
ventor of the subject matter of the patent application.99 Hence,
a patent is invalid if the invention is useless, duplicative, obvi-
ous, or lacking in novelty. Although the policy of Lear extends
to all patents, regardless of the likelihood and nature of the in-
validity claim, 00 license agreements can work to protect only
patents invalid because of lack of novelty.' 0 '
For example, suppose a patent is invalid because the in-
vention is useless.*0 2 Since the standard of utility is easily sat-
isfied,103 it follows that an invention that fails for lack of utility
"will be of little or no profit to the inventor."z0 4 In this case, it
does not matter whether a patent license preserves the invalid
patent, since the harm to consumers is likely to be minimal if
the subject matter of the patent is useless to them.
Nor does the fact that a patent duplicates another patent
pose a threat to consumers, since the late-coming rival is sim-
ply appropriating part of the value of an existing patent monop-
oly, thereby increasing competition and reducing allocative
distortion. 0 5 Nevertheless, the owner of the valid patent may
be harmed by the late-comer's entry into the market, for the ef-
fect of competition in the patented product will reduce the
99. The first party to submit a patent application for a particular invention
has priority. If the application satisfies the patentability requirements it will be
approved and all later applications concerning the same invention will be re-
jected. 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) (1976). The factors relevant to patentability are
whether the invention is new, useful, and nonobvious to a practitioner in the
field. Id. §§ 101, 103. The inventor must also be the first to conceive the inven-
tion, not merely the first to apply. Id. § 102(g); Breuer v. DeMarinis, 558 F.2d 22,
27-28 (C.C.P.A. 1977); P. ROSENBERG, supra note 8, § 10.01(2).
100. See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 671-74 (1969).
101. See infra text accompanying notes 112-17.
102. A useful invention
may be applied to some beneficial use in society, in contradistinction to
an invention, which is injurious to morals, the health, or the good order
of society. It is not necessary to establish, that the invention is of such
general utility, as to supersede all other inventions now in practice to
accomplish the same purpose .... The law... does not look to the
degree of utility ....




105. The allocative distortion, and hence the harm to consumers, is less in a
market with two firms (a duopoly) than in a monopoly, provided the duopolists
do not cooperate. Cf. W. NICHOLSON, supra note 98, at 316-17 (an oligopoly is
unlikely to achieve monopoly profits).
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profit anticipated by the original inventor. 06 Consequently, the
party with the best information and the strongest incentive to
challenge a duplicative patent is the original inventor, a party
who is unlikely to be bound by a license agreement to the sub-
sequent patentee.
Patents that are invalid because the invention is not novel
or is obvious ostensibly pose a threat to consumer well-be-
ing.107 But the threat proves illusory. Nonlicensed firms in the
same industry as the patentee, and potential entrants from
outside the industry will have an incentive to challenge these
patents.108 As long as the cost of a patent suit is less than the
potential royalty payments, 0 9 competitors and potential com-
petitors of the patentee will have an incentive to seek a decla-
ration of invalidity,"n0 rather than accept a license.
Although nonlicensed parties have an incentive to chal-
lenge invalid patents, that incentive must be coupled with
knowledge and proof of invalidity before a patent challenge is
feasible. That information will be available if the invention
106. Monopoly profits from patents are a primary incentive for R & D. See
supra note 7.
107. In these cases an illegitimate monopoly is established in a market for a
potentially valuable product, such as the gyroscope in Lear. Even if the inven-
tion is not intrinsically valuable, an illegitimate patent or patents may be used
to establish an illegal cartel See, e.g., Duplan Corp. v. Deering-Milliken, Inc,
444 F. Supp. 648, 683 (D.S.C. 1977) (a settlement agreement was used to estab-
lish a cartel), modified, 594 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015
(1980); Priest, Cartels and Patent License Agreements, 20 J.L. & EcON. 309, 377
(1977) (settlement agreements ending in cross-licensing agreements should be
discouraged because they encourage firms to seek invalid patents and use them
to establish illegal cartels).
108. If a firm is a monopolist providing a new product and is making supra-
normal profits, then in the absence of barriers to entry (besides the patent)
other firms will be attracted to the industry, dissipating the monoply profits if
they can successfully challenge the patent. See W. NiCHOLSON, supra note 98,
at 292-94. An entry barrier is an impediment to potential industry entrants,
making it difficult or costly for them to compete with firms already in the indus-
try. It is the source of monopoly power. See id.
109. Although a license may require continued royalty payments after a
finding of invalidity, licensees will still be motiviated to challenge a patent if
postinvalidity royalties plus litigation costs will be less than the royalties on a
valid patent. The Grunewald court, in striking down a reduced royalty pay-
ment contingent upon a finding of invalidity, made the extreme suggestion that
any royalty payment required on an invalid patent violates the Lear doctrine.
Grunewald v. Power Swing Partners, 9 Bankr. 512, 520 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980).
In light of the benefits of Grunewald type licenses described in Part fI of this
Note, this proposal goes too far.
110. The courts are liberal in allowing declaratory judgments regarding pat-
ent infringement and validity. See Bresnick v. United States Vitamin Corp., 139
F.2d 239, 242 (2d Cir. 1943). One of the purposes of the Declaratory Judgment
Act is to prevent patent owners from suppressing competition with threats of
infringement suits. See Hanes v. Millard, 189 U.S.P.Q. 331, 335 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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fails the nonobviousness criterion; failure to meet this criterion
of patentability necessarily implies that the invention was obvi-
ous to members of the industry."ll In contrast, when the issue
is lack of novelty, the information needed for a patent chal-
lenge might not be obtainable. On the facts of Lear, the belief
that licensees need encouragement to challenge invalid patents
is justified. The patent there was declared invalid because the
invention had been anticipated in earlier patents.112 The object
of controversy was a gyroscope, a component of an aircraft nav-
igation system and undoubtedly a sophisticated piece of tech-
nology.X"3 In circumstances such as those in Lear, when a
patentee and a prospective licensee negotiate a license agree-
ment, there is apt to be asymmetry in the information available
to the inventor and potential licensees about the invention."l 4
Unless a prospective licensee has conducted research related
to the invention, the only information available to outsiders will
be that which the inventor discloses in the patent and during
111. Nonobviousness "appears to be the predominant ground in court deci-
sions of invalidity." Kitti, Patent Invalidity Studies: A Survey, 20 IDEA 55, 56
(1978). See also F. SCHERER, supra note 33, at 440 (the critical hurdle to patent-
ability is nonobviousness). In some cases, the information needed to challenge
a patent on the grounds of obviousness will not be possessed by any member
of the industry, not even the patentee. The test of obviousness was stated in
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966). "[T]he scope and content of the
prior art are to be determined, differences between the prior art and the claims
at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art
resolved." Id. at 17. A difficulty arises since a person having "ordinary skill" is
charged with knowledge of all prior art disclosed at the time of invention. See
Tokyo Shibaura Elec. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 548 F.2d 88, 94 (3d Cir. 1977).
Since prior art includes previous patents and publications, either foreign or do-
mestic, National Rolled Thread Die Co. v. E.W. Terry Screw Prods., Inc., 541
F.2d 593, 596 (6th Cir. 1976), there may be a substantial disparity between the
information held by the idealized person with ordinary skill in the field, and ac-
tual practitioners.
112. The Supreme Court did not rule on the validity of Adkin's patent. See
Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 675 (1969). The trial judge had found the pat-
ent invalid because it had been completely anticipated by prior art. Id. at 660.
See Popeil Bros., Inc. v. Schick Elec., Inc., 494 F.2d 162, 164 (7th Cir. 1974); Harig
Products, Inc. v. K.O. Lee Co., 195 U.S.P.Q. 292, 294 (N.D. III. 1977), affd, 594
F.2d 609 (7th'Cir. 1979).
113. 395 U.S. at 654.
114. See C. LAYrON, TEN INNOVATIONS 148 (1972) (trouble with licensed os-
cilloscope was not discovered until licensee began production). See also Caves,
Crookell & Killing, supra note 5, at 3.
Technical knowledge possesses the classic property of asymmetrical
access by the potential parties to a transaction to knowledge about the
expected payout. The licensor has the relevant experience. If the li-
censee were fully able to evaluate the proferred technology, the license
agreement would dwindle to a right to infringe the licensor's patents-
not a rare outcome ....
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the course of negotiation with prospective licensees." 5 If an in-
vention is technically complex, a nonlicensee may not possess
sufficient information to judge the validity of the patent." 6
Thus, the Lear doctrine should be limited to those cases in
which the patent is invalid for lack of novelty and the invention
is technically complex, for only in such cases will licensees be
the only parties with both the incentive and the information to
challenge the patent." 7
Even when a patent license has the tendency to protect an
invalid patent, several factors mitigate the allocative ineffi-
ciency suffered by society as a consequence of the patent grant.
By discouraging patent challenges, these licenses avoid litiga-
tion costs" 8 and protect valid patents from wrongful invalida-
tion," 9 thus preserving the incentive to innovate. Furthermore,
contrary to judicial opinion, invalid patent monopolies do not
115. The patent application must contain a written disclosure "of the inven-
tion, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear,
concise and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it
pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same."
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976). See In Re Knowlton, 481 F.2d 1357, 1366 (C.C.P.A. 1973);
In re Hirsch, 295 F.2d 251, 254 (C.C.P.A. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 888 (1962).
The potential licensees are likely to have as much information and exper-
tise as the Patent Office in dealing with an invention. W. BowMAN, supra note
8, at 25. The Patent Office is not a good predictor of the value of an invention;
licensees are apt to be better predictors. Id. at 46. An invention that will prob-
ably not be patentable or valuable will not attract many application licenses,
and will not sustain high royalty rates. A patent that is probably invalid, like-
wise, will not attract licensees at a high royalty rate.
116. Novelty may be defeated by several different factors, including the
existence of foreign or domestic patents or publications antedating the licensed
patent. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1976). For a technically complex invention these
sources of information may be difficult to locate. A licensee may be more likely
to discover them than non-licensees, however, because patent licenses often in-
clude transfers of unpatented technical knowledge, see P. ROSENBERG, supra
note 8, § 3.08, and because licensees often institute research programs to fur-
ther develop the patented invention, see Caves, Crookell & Killing, supra note
5, at 11-12.
117. An alternative to relying on licensees to challenge patents was sug-
gested by Bowman, who argued that the Department of Justice be allowed to
initiate such challenges. See W. BowmAN, supra note 8, at 254.
118. See E. LOVELL, DOMESTIC LICENSING PRACTICES 10-11 (1969); F. SCHER-
ER, supra note 33, at 453 (cases involving petroleum cracking patents lasted 15
years and legal fees amounted to over $3 million). Licenses discouraging pat-
ent challenges are particularly valuable to small entrepreneurs whose patents
are challenged by powerful rivals on either good or spurious grounds, and who
often choose to settle out of court, giving up their exclusive position and licens-
ing the challenger to avoid the cost and uncertainty of protracted litigation. See
id. at 453.
119. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966) (Court noted
disparagingly the "notorious difference between the standards applied by the
Patent Office and by the courts"); Timberg, Antitrust Aspects of Patent Litiga-
tion, Arbitration, and Settlement, 59 J. PAT. OFr. SoC'Y 244, 251 (1977) (one dis-
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always evolve into bona fide economic monopolies. A patent
grant will not create monopoly profits unless there is both a de-
mand for the patented product and no close substitute, condi-
tions which are not met for the majority of patents.120 Finally,
the allocative distortion caused by these practices should not
be measured by the full duration of the invalid patent monop-
oly. Rather, the true cost of protective licensing is the alloca-
tive inefficiency that occurs during the extra time an invalid
patent remains in force because patent challenges by licensees
have been discouraged.
The cases following Lear that have struck down licensing
restrictions because they diminish the incentive of licensees to
challenge potentially invalid patents have cut too broad a
swath.121 If the patent is invalid because the invention is not
useful, the subsequent technical invalidation is of little conse-
quence. When the source of invalidity is duplication or obvi-
ousness, nonlicensed parties can challenge the patent.122
Nonlicensed parties will also be able to challenge if the inven-
tion lacks novelty but is not technically complex. Only in cases
like Lear, where licensing is important to gain information
about an invention, should society be concerned about license
restrictions protecting invalid patents.123
B. EXTENSION OF THE PATENT MONOPOLY AS A SOURCE OF
ALLOCATIVE DISTORTION
While the risk that restrictive licenses will protect invalid
patents is overstated, the economic theory that restrictive
licenses extend the scope of the patent monopoly is clearly un-
sound. The monopoly extension theory is based on the pre-
sumption that a patentee, if not restrained, can use the
trict court judge called the Patent Office the "sickest institution" ever
invented).
"Because the possibility of a court invalidity judgment can make a newly
issued patent a 'lottery ticket'. . . the perceived value of a patent to the paten-
tee is almost certainly affected." Kitti, supra note 111, at 55-56.
120. See supra note 5.
121. The courts have not considered the relationship between the source of
patent invalidity and the need to stimulate patent challenges by licensees. See
supra text accompanying notes 38-94.
122. Most patent validity challenges focus on these grounds. See supra
note 111.
123. There is also a danger that invalid patents may be used to establish an
illegal cartel. In Duplan Corp. v. Deering-MIlliken, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 648, 683
(D.S.C. 1977), modified, 594 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015
(1980), the court found that an agreement to settle patent litigation was actu-
ally a scheme to cartelize a market.
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economic power of the patent to coerce licensees to pay exces-
sive royalties, royalties on unwanted patents, or royalties for a
term exceeding the length of the patent grant.124 Conse-
quently, a per se rule has been established against postexpira-
tion royalties' 25 and mandatory package licensing.126
Courts object to tying arrangements in patent licenses on
the discredited patent leverage theory.127 According to this the-
ory, the patent needed by a licensee is a tying good, giving the
licensor sufficient economic power to compel the licensee to
purchase a tied product from the licensor at an above market
price.128 The theory breaks down at two points. First, if the
patented invention has many close substitutes, the patentee
will not have the requisite economic power in the tying prod-
uct. If the patentee attempts to extract a monopoly price for
his or her invention or otherwise impose burdensome terms for
its use, such as requiring the licensee to purchase a second pat-
ent that is either unwanted or overpriced, prospective licensees
will simply purchase a substitute instead of the patentee's in-
vention.129 Second, even if the patentee does possess economic
power by virtue of a patent in one product, he or she cannot ex-
tend that monopoly to a second product by tying its purchase
to the first. Any difference between the economic value of the
second product and the price charged for it pursuant to the tie
will simply be treated by a licensee as an increase in the price
demanded for the patented product. Faced with such a condi-
tion on the acquisition of the invention, a potential licensee will
either decrease his or her use of the invention or decline to
take a license at all. In either case, the patentee has not ex-
tended his or her monopoly in the tying product to the tied
product; the demand curve for the tying product establishes an
upper limit on the price, after deducting the market price of the
tied product, that the patentee can extract for the package. 3 0
124. See W. BOWMAN, supra note 8, at 54.
125. See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
127. See W. BowMAN, supra note 8, at 55 ("patent leveraging, in a word, is
no more plausible than lifting oneself by one's bootstraps"); Andewelt, supra
note 95, at 409 ('The means chosen by the patentee for extracting royalty pay-
ments for a patent license is neither necessary nor likely to raise competitive
problems."); Baxter, supra note 11, at 323 (package licensing of technologically
related patents with a common royalty base should be permitted); Posner, Ex-
clusionary Practices and the Antitrust Laws, 41 U. CH . L REV. 506, 508 (1974)
(leveraging theory is incorrect).
128. See supra note 30.
129. See supra note 5.
130. See Posner, supra note 127, at 508-10. See also Baxter, supra note 11, at
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The foregoing analysis applies in particular to postexpira-
tion licensing. In postexpiration licensing, the tying product is
the preexpiration license and the tied product is the pos-
texpiration license. Since the postexpiration license is useless
to the licensee, he or she will simply regard it as part of the
price for the preexpiration license. Accordingly, a rational li-
censee would not pay more for a license requiring royalty pay-
ments after the expiration of the underlying patent than for
one which terminated upon expiration of the patent. Similar
analysis applies to most forms of package licensing. If the tied
patents in the package are useless to the licensee, he or she
will treat any part of the royalty attributable to them like the
royalties charged for the postexpiration license in the preced-
ing example-that is, the licensee will treat them as part of the
price for the wanted patent. The licensee may, however, find
the tied patents useful. In that case, the licensee will treat the
difference between the price of the tied patent and the price of
any close substitutes as part of the price for the tying patent,
which has no close substitutes. Consequently, the difference
between the actual and market price of the tied patent will be
limited by what the licensee is willing to pay for the use of the
tying patent. Moreover, if there are no close substitutes for the
tied patents in the package, the patentee will already possess a
monopoly in those inventions.
In each of the preceding examples, the patentee was un-
able to earn through a tying arrangement more than he or she
could earn by setting the price on the original patented product
at the profit maximizing level. Economists have recognized,
however, that a tying arrangement can increase monopoly prof-
its when used as a vehicle for price discrimination.'13 Price dis-
crimination is the practice of charging low prices to customers
deriving minimal benefit from the purchase of a commodity,
while charging higher prices to customers valuing the commod-
ity more, thus generating greater revenue than could be ob-
tained by charging a uniform monopoly price.132 Market power
319 (if the price of the tied product is greater than its market price, then the
patentee must offer a reduction of the royalty rate on the tying patent).
131. See Baxter, supra note 11, at 368-69; Posner, supra note 127, at 510-13.
Posner does not necessarily object to price discrimination by patentholders,
however. See infra note 138.
The social harms of price discrimination arise from its possible use as a
means of predation by sellers, or as a source of price discount to powerful buy-
ers in preference of smaller buyers. L. SuLirvAN, supra note 8, §§ 219, 222.
132. According to the normal definition of price discrimination used by
economists, "if the ratio between the marginal cost and the price are the same
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alone does not allow a seller to practice price discrimination.133
For price discrimination to be successful, customers must have
differing preferences for the seller's product, preferences which
the seller is able to measure, and the seller must be able to seg-
ment the market between high-price and low-price customers
to prevent arbitrage.134 A patentee can engage in price discrim-
ination through mandatory package licensing whenever one of
the patented inventions is a product consumed in the course of
using a process invention covered by another patent in the
package. The licensee's demand for the patented product indi-
cates the intensity of a licensee's use of the related process pat-
ent, and thus the value of the process patent to the licensee.135
The package license would stipulate minimal royalties for the
use of the process innovation but require inflated royalties on
the product innovation. The excess royalty charged for the pat-
ented product would serve as an additional royalty on the pat-
ented process, thus permitting the patentee to exact higher
royalty payments from high-intensity users, to whom the pro-
cess is undoubtedly more valuable.136 In this case, the patents
confer the requisite market power as well as the means to seg-
ment the market, while the mandatory purchase of the product
license serves as a "counting device," enabling the licensor to
measure the preferences of licensees for the process license. 3 7
It should be noted, however, that no leverage is involved in
for [two] sales no... discrimination has occurred." L. SULaVrA, supra note 8,
§ 219. Alternatively, the law looks for a price differential on separate sales of
the same commodity. Id. The normal economic definition is not useful in the
case of patent licenses. Since the marginal cost of licensing is essentially zero,
ratios between price and marginal costs cannot be formed.
133. See Baxter, supra note 11, at 368-69.
134. See F. SCHERER, supra note 33, at 315..See also W. BOWMAN, supra note
8, at 100-16.
135. See W. BOWMAN, supra note 8, at 100-16; Baxter, supra note 11, at 368-
69.
136. See W. BowMAN, supra note 8, at 103-04.
137. Profesor Baxter has suggested another way in which mandatory pack-
age licensing may be used as a price discriminating device. If the alternative to
package licensing would be to offer each individual patent at a uniform price to
all potential licensees, the patentee would be unable to obtain the highest pos-
sible price from licensees willing to pay a comparatively high price for one of
the patents, because to do so would be to lose the business of licensees willing
to pay only lesser amounts. But if different licensees place different relative
values on various patents, a patentee might increase his or her profits by com-
bining the different patents into a package. Although different licensees might
assign different values to each patent in the package, the maximum values as-
signed by each licensee to the package may be more uniform than the values
assigned to each patent. Thus the patentee can charge a higher uniform price
for the package than the aggregate uniform price he could charge for each pat-
ent in the package. See Baxter, supra note 11, at 324-25.
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the above situation; the patentee simply uses the product li-
cense to extract the full monopoly return to which he is enti-
tled by virtue of his patent grant in the process innovation.138
Moreover, the device reduces the allocative distortion caused
by the patent monopoly in the process innovation, since by dis-
criminating the patentee will be able to increase profits by li-
censing additional users.139 Of course, price discrimination
may not have an output-increasing effect if, absent price dis-
crimination, the patentee would have maximized profits at the
lowest price any potential licensee was willing to pay for the
process. In this latter situation, price discrimination is simply a
means of appropriating the consumer surplus' 40 from high-
price customers.'41
Whether mandatory package licensing should be con-
demned simply because it can be used to appropriate con-
sumer surplus is doubtful. In order for price discrimination to
be effective, consumers must have differing preferences for the
patents in the package.142 If the package involves technologi-
cally related patents producing the same end product, which is
typically the case, potential licensees are likely to have similar
preferences with respect to each patent in the package; 43 that
is, the demand curve for each patent is likely to be relatively
flat, so that consumer surplus will be minimal even if a uniform
price is charged.'" Moreover, the patentee can achieve price
138. See W. BOWMAN, supra note 8, at 64-65 ("exploiting the full value [of] a
patent" requires patent discrimination); id. at 101 ("[P]rice discrimination [is
a] means by which a patentee maximizes the return ascribable to the differen-
tial advantage the patent affords. Leveraging to a new monopoly is not in-
volved."); Posner, supra note 127, at 513-14 ("If one thought that the patent laws
tended to undercompensate inventors, resulting in a suboptimal rate of innova-
tion, one might want to encourage price discrimination in order to increase the
amount of investment in inventive activity.")
139. A monopolist charging a uniform price restricts output below the per-
fectly competitive level, causing allocative inefficiency. See supra notes 34-35.
A monopolist practicing perfect price discrimination, where each customer is
charged the maximum price he or she is willing to pay, chooses an output
equal to the output of a perfect competitor, thus eliminating the allocative dis-
tortion. See Posner, supra note 127, at 510-13. Price discrimination is unlikely
to be perfect, however, and imperfect price discrimination may result in an in-
crease or a decrease of monopoly output. See W. BowMAN, supra note 8, at 111.
In many instances, however, price discrimination assuredly raises output. See
id. at 111-12.
140. Consumer surplus is "the difference between the maximum price that
a consumer is willing to pay for an item and the actual price that is paid." M.
VESETH, ITR=ODUCTORY MICROECONOMICS 271 (1981).
141. See P. AREEDA, ANTrrRusT ANALysis 1429 (3d ed. 1981).
142. See W. BowMAN, supra note 8, at 103.
143. See Baxter, supra note 11, at 326.
144. Of course, when the consumer surplus obtainable by price discrimina-
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discrimination through other apparently legal licensing ar-
rangements. 45 For example, suppose a market can be seg-
mented into high-intensity users who assign a high value to a
particular patented invention and low-intensity users who as-
sign a lower value to it. To maximize profits, a patentee could
simply license the invention at a royalty rate related to output
or some other measure of use. Finally, the fewer the number of
potential licensees for a patented invention, the less likely the
patentee will be to license at a uniform price.146 It may be
more efficient in such circumstances to bargain individually
with each potential licensee on a patent-by-patent basis for a
price related to the elasticity of each licensee's demand for the
invention. 47
III. PATENT LICENSING AS A SOURCE OF PRODUCTIVE
EFFICIENCY
A. A NEW PARADIGM FOR THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LICENSING AGREEMENTS
Traditional judicial treatment of patent licenses has been
unduly harsh to patentees, 148 and has overstated the cost of
seemingly anticompetitive royalty plans. Courts have con-
tion is very small, the additional incentive to innovate provided by price dis-
criminating royalty terms is equally small. Cf. supra notes 5-7 and
accompanying text (discussing ways in which patent system provides incentive
to innovate).
145. See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 11, at 326.
146. See id.
147. Id. Historically, patentees have felt that they have the right to charge
different royalties to different licensees for the use of the same patent. Never-
theless, there is some case law to the effect that discriminatory rates can con-
stitute patent misuse or an unfair method of competition under § 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976). See, e.g., LaPeyre v. Fed-
eral Trade Comm'n, 366 F.2d 117, 121 (5th Cir. 1966) (patentee of shrimp
processing machine charged higher rental rate in sections of country with
higher wages); Peelers Co. v. Wendt, 260 F. Supp. 193, 201-02 (W.D. Wash. 1966)
(upholding jury verdict against patentee of shrimp processing machine); Lai-
tram Corp. v. King Crab, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 9, 17 (D. Alas.) (same), modified, 245
F. Supp. 1019 (1965). On the other hand, there is case law upholding discrimi-
natory rates. See, e.g., Bela Seating Co. v. Poloron Prods., Inc., 438 F.2d 733, 738
(7th Cir.) (no antitrust violation as there were rational bases upon which pat-
entee could refuse to grant defendant a license on the same terms as previous
license to a third party), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 922 (1971); La Salle Street Press,
Inc. v. McCormick & Henderson, Inc., 445 F.2d 84, 95-96 (7th Cir. 1971) (patentee
can consider factors affecting his own business in determining to whom a li-
cense will be offered and on what conditions).
148. During the last few decades courts faced with patent-antitrust con-
flicts have tended to prefer antitrust law over patent law. This ten-
dency is perhaps a product of the increased use of an analytical
approach in the adjudication of economic issues. Available analytical
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demned licenses on grounds of allocative inefficiency while ig-
noring the possible productive efficiencies inherent in most
royalty plans. 49
The concept of "productive efficiency refers to the effective
use of resources by particular firms,"1S0 including efficient man-
ufacture and distribution of products, the efficient production
and dissemination of information, and efficient planning for un-
certainty.'5 ' Patent licensing can contribute to all of these
types of productive efficiency, particularly by permitting firms
to cope efficiently with the uncertainty inherent in R & D.
Economists evaluate the social worth of business practices
and government intervention in the economy by estimating the
resultant allocative and productive efficiency, and balancing
gains of one type of efficiency against losses of the other. 5 2
tools are far more sensitive in identifying and validating antitrust dan-
gers than patent benefits.
L SuLLWAN, supra note 11, § 177. See also Arnold, Aspelund, Brantley & Shurn,
supra note 11, at 157 (for patent licensors there are "not any completely safe
harbors" offering protection from antitrust laws) (quoting the former chief of
the Patent Group of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice). But
since GTE Sylvania, see infra notes 153-56 and accompanying text, the attitude
has been changing. See, e.g., Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257
(1979); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 648 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1981);
SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
1016 (1982); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). See also Arnold, supra note 1, at 137
("The law of technology transfer is grossly uncertain fand] antitransfer.");
Bender, Technology Transfer Lessons from Selected Cases, in 2 TECHNOLOGY L-
CENSING 164 (T. Arnold & T. Smegal eds. 1982) (courts becoming less reluctant
to accord patents a right and reason to exist); Hammond & Medlock, supra note
5, at 169-70 ("trend toward encouraging innovation and securing a just reward
to inventors").
149. See supra text accompanying notes 38-94. But see Turner, supra note 7,
at 155-56 (§ 7 of the Clayton Act not applicable to high risk exclusive patent
licenses).
150. IL BoRi, supra note 33, at 91.
151. See W. NICHOLSON, supra note 98, at 412-18. Productive efficiency re-
quires that sources be allocated efficiently among firms, that firms use the re-
sources efficiently, and that firms produce an efficient combination of outputs.Id.
"It is a common misconception that a monopolist's increased efficiency re-
dounds only to the monopolist's benefit .... If marginal cost is lowered, the
intersection with marginal revenue moves to the right, indicating a larger out-
put and a lowered price. That benefits consumers as well as the monopolist."
R. BoRK, supra note 33, at 101.
152. See, e.g., I. BoRu, supra note 33, at 91-110.
[Productive and allocative] efficiency make up the overall efficiency
that determines the level of our society's wealth, or consumer welfare.
The whole task of antitrust can be summed up as the effort to improve
allocative efficiency without impairing productive efficiency so greatly




The Supreme Court implicitly endorsed the application of this
mode of economic analysis to antitrust cases in Continental
T.V. v. GTE Sylvania.15 3 Before GTE Sylvania, courts scruti-
nized and often banned vertical restrictions placed by manufac-
turers on the marketing of their products by wholesalers and
retailers because of the negative effect of such restrictions on
allocative efficiency.154 In GTE Sylvania, however, the Court
recognized that vertical restraints often produce efficiencies in
the marketing of a product.155 The vertical restraint in that
case was upheld because the gain in productive efficiency out-
weighed any possible loss of allocative efficiency) 56
Antitrust law expresses a commitment to maintaining free
Whether one looks at the texts of the antitrust statutes, the legisla-
tive intent behind them, or the requirements of proper judicial behav-
ior, therefore, the case is overwhelming for judicial adherence to the
single goal of consumer welfare in the interpretation of the antitrust
laws. Only that goal is consistent with congressional intent, and,
equally important, only that goal permits courts to behave responsibly
and to achieve the virtues appropriate to law.
Id. at 89. See also F. SCHERER, supra note 33, at 9-44 (describing the economic
approach to evaluating antitrust policy and the business practices it regulates);
Abbott, Paradox Regained: Towards a "New Economic Approach" to Vertical
Restraints Policy, 48 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 565, 584-86 (1980) (courts should weigh
consumer welfare against productive efficiency to evaluate the desirability of
vertical restraints); Baker, Interconnected Problems of Doctrine and Economics
in the Section One Labyrinth. Is Sylvania a Way Out?, 67 VA. L. REv. 1457, 1458
(1981) (the function of antitrust law is the maximization of consumer welfare).
153. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
154. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 381-82
(1967). Courts traditionally emphasize allocative efficiency without considering
productive efficiency in patent cases. See supra text accompanying notes 38-94.
See also Dietrich, supra note 31, at 269-70 (non-restrictive patent licenses are
not subject to scrutiny under § 1 of the Sherman Act, while restrictive patent
licenses are).
155. 433 U.S. at 54-57.
156. Id. at 57-59. See Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Ap-
proack Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHL L REV. 1, 2, 12-13 (1977).
Likewise, many contracts in patent rights appear to be anticompetitive, but
on closer analysis are found to enhance efficiency. See, e.g., United States v.
General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 490 (1926) (patent license and license restric-
tions evaluated under rule of reason); United States v. Studiengeselischaft
Kohle m.b.H., 670 F.2d 1122, 1128-29 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (when reviewing a restric-
tive patent license the court avoided the analysis of the per se cases and, refer-
ring to GTE Sylvania, invoked a rule of reason standard); Berkey Photo, Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 302 (2d Cir. 1979) (court applied GTE Sylva-
nia to a restrictive trade secret licensing agreement), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093
(1980). In general, the Department of Justice now applies the rule of reason to
antitrust review of patent licenses. See Arnold, Aspelund, Brantley & Shurn,
supra note 11, at 153-55. The Department of Justice also has shifted its test of
mandatory package licenses from a per se test to a rule of reason test. Id. The
Department of Justice reviews royalty schemes by applying the rule of reason
and weighing the goal of efficient valuation of a patent against the risk of allo-
cative inefficiency in the form of cartelization. See id. at 154.
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and open business competition. 57 Patent law, on the other
hand, forecloses competition as a reward to inventors. 5 8 The
conflict between antitrust and patent law is most evident in de-
termining the methods a patentee may use to exploit the pat-
ent monopoly.159 Recent cases dealing with patent application
licensing160 and licenses resulting from settlement agree-
ments16' indicate, however, that the courts are retreating from
their earlier harsh attitude toward patent licenses. This is con-
sistent with the philosophy of GTE Sylvania, which calls for a
balancing of allocative efficiency losses against productive effi-
ciency gains when evaluating royalty terms in patent
licenses. 62
157. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
The end sought was the prevention of restraints to free competition in
business and commercial transactions which tended to restrict produc-
tion, raise prices or otherwise control the market to the detriment of
purchasers or consumers of good and services, all of which had come to
be regarded as a special form of public injury.
Id. at 493. See also SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1210 (2d Cir. 1981)
(the purpose of antitrust law is to protect competition in the marketplace), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982).
158. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
159. See Selinger, Patent Licensing in the Afterglow of Sylvania: Practicali-
ties of Life under the Rule of Reason, 63 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 353, 360-61 (1981)
("When, however, a patentee attempts to exploit his patent in a manner which
exceeds the scope of his exclusionary right, his actions are then subject to...
restraints, such as the antitrust laws .... ).
160. In Aronson the Court refused to find that a patent application inher-
ently had the economic power to support a tying agreement. See supra notes
67-72 and accompanying text. But cf. supra note 30 (patents invariably are
found to have the economic power necessary to support a tying arrangement).
161. See Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368, 1373 (6th Cir.) (a pat-
ent license, part of a settlement agreement, escaped the scrutiny of Lear be-
cause the potential allocative distortion that could be created by the patent was
minimal), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976).
162. See Selinger, supra note 159, at 373-76. "[A]s a result of the shift from
Schwinn to Sylvania, a patentee who is willing to face the uncertainty engen-
dered by a rule of reason defense can now engage in more creative licensing
.... At least some vertical restraints [in patent licenses] are likely to be
deemed reasonable in nature and scope. . . ." Id. at 373.
Since any given technology is one of many inputs that can be used
in the manufacture and marketing of a product, licensing of technology
in a sense can be viewed as a vertical arrangement. Because a manu-
facturer faces competition from substitutes for his products, the manu-
facturer has every incentive to structure a vertical arrangement to
achieve the lowest possible cost in the manufacture and distribution of
the product. Thus, the manufacturer has every incentive to obtain the
most efficient technology for manufacture of the product, so long as the
costs of obtaining the technology do not outweigh the benefits of using
the technology. The lower the manufacturing costs, the better the
product is positioned in competition with substitutes for it, and hence
the more profit potentially available to the manufacturer. Lower manu-
facturing costs are in society's interest even when they do not translate
into lower prices to consumers because the lower the manufacturing
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B. RISK REDUCTION AS A SOURCE OF PRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCY
Effective royalty payment plans indirectly promote produc-
tive efficiency by encouraging licensing instead of exclusive use
for marginal patent licensors.163 Licensing an invention almost
always makes the development process more efficient. Nor-
mally, license agreements stipulate that the licensee must re-
port technical information and improvements of the invention
to the licensor,164 which effectively puts more R & D resources
under the control of the patentee. Licensing also promotes ac-
ceptance of an innovation in an industry or in the market place,
as the innovation achieves a reputation of success. 6 Further-
more, an inventor frequently lacks the resources to satisfy mar-
ket demand for a new product or process,166 since the cost and
risk of expanding facilities is often prohibitive. 167 Licensing
thus allows the patentee to make use of the existing productive
facilities of competitors.
Effective methods of collecting royalties add to these effi-
ciencies because they allow the patentee to cope more easily
with the burdens of uncertainty in R & D. The magnitude of
the uncertainty facing an innovator is enormous; the patent ap-
plication process, technical development, production and mar-
keting of an innovation, and the actions of competitors all
generate uncertainty.
Economic theory supports the view that a licensor facing
risk will forgo royalty revenue in order to implement risk re-
costs, the lower the allocation of valuable resources necessary to man-
ufacture the product, and therefore the more resources available for
other parts of the economy.
Andewelt, supra note 95, at 406.
163. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
164. See C. LAYroN, supra note 114, at 87 (future development aided when
licensees share in the process, feeding back their ideas); Bowman, supra note
5, at 9 ("[m]any such contracts .. . lead to productive efficiencies"); Caves,
Crookell & Killing, supra note 5, at 17 (43% of sampled licenses contained such
an agreement).
165. L SULLrVAN, supra note 8, § 183.
166. Small corporations often need licensing since they lack the marketing
organization necessary to commercialize an invention. C. LAYTON, supra note
114, at 87; F. SCHERER, supra note 33, at 414. The situation here is similar to
cases involving vertical restraints on trade that have the effect of increasing
market efficiency. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S.
36 (1976); Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979);
Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946
(1978).
167. Some selectivity is possible. A patentee can license another party to
either manufacture, use, or sell an invention. P. ROSENBERG, supra note 8,




ducing royalty terms. A rational entrepreneur invests the
amount of resources in R & D that will maximize the expected
discounted profit from an innovation.168 Based on past experi-
ence and other available information, an entrepreneur consid-
ering an innovation calculates the probability of technical and
commercial success, the probability of obtaining a patent, and
the probable response of competitors. 169 These data are used
to estimate the magnitude and variance of profit from innova-
tion. The greater the variance of possible profit the less attrac-
tive is an R & D project.o7 0 The theory that greater risk results
in reduced R & D follows from the assumption that entrepre-
neurs are risk averse.171 If entrepreneurs were indifferent to
risk, their goal would be to maximize expected profits. 7 2 An R
& D project offering a certain return of $10,000 would be equally
attractive to one offering a fifty percent probability of a $15,000
return and a fifty percent probability of a $5,000 return.173 A
risk averse entrepreneur, however, would prefer the certainty
of $10,000, and would even prefer something less, perhaps a cer-
tainty of $9,000, to the more risky project.174
168. W. NICHOLSON, supra note 98, at 156; F. SCHERER, supra note 33, at 292-
93; J. WILSON & S. DARR, supra note 5, at 400. An entrepreneur calculates ex-
pected profits by multiplying the probability of receiving a particular profit by
its value, and then summing the resulting terms. See I. WILSON & S. DARR,
supra note 5, at 400.
169. Firms also consider the cost of R & D and the distribution of profits
over time. See generally W. BowMA, supra note 8, at 36 ("the profit motive op-
erates in the research and development aspect of business"); J. ScHMooKLER,
INVENTION AND ECONoMIc GRowTH (1966) (examining reasons for variations
over a period of time in inventions in a given industry); J. WILSON & S. DARR,
supra note 5 (discussing the use of economic analysis in the process of mana-
gerial decision making); Kamien & Schwartz, supra note 15 (survey of relation-
ship between resource allocation to R & D and technical advance).
170. See, e.g., J. WILSON & S. DARa, supra note 5, at 399-404 (forecasting un-
certain cash flow from an investment project).
171. See Caves, Crookell & Killing, supra note 5, at 3 (assume risk aversion
in a study of technology licensing). A risk averse firm prefers a certain return
on investment over an uncertain return with the same value. See H. VARIaN,
MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 108 (1978).
172. W. NIcHoLSoN, supra note 98, at 153-55; F. SCHERER, supra note 33, at
414.
173. Expected profits are the same in each situation. See supra note 168.
174. Empirical work indicates that licensors reduce royalty payments in or-
der to gain risk reducing terms in patent licenses. Caves, Crookell & Killing,
supra note 5, at 25. "If the licensor imposes some restrictions on the licensee
... he reduces the licensee's potential rents and thus the stream of revenue
that he can capture in that transaction. Therefore the presence of revenue-re-
stricting terms in license agreements implies some sacrifice of expected reve-
nue for another objective. Id at 16. The more extensive the restrictions
imposed on the licensee, the greater the royalty reduction tends to be. Id. at
18-19. Surveys reveal that risk reducing royalty arrangements are common; and
most common when risk exposure is especially great. Id. at 16, 18.
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The power of royalty provisions to reduce the burden of
uncertainty is made apparent by examining four types of pat-
ent licenses: application, invalid patent, postexpiration, and
package licenses. Application licensing is designed to cope
with the uncertainty of patent approval and the amount of time
it will take to obtain approval. Approval depends on the Patent
Office's application of the patentability standards to each
case.175 These standards are difficult to apply, causing substan-
tial uncertainty regarding patent approval. 76 Furthermore, the
application itself takes an average of forty-two months to
process. 177
An inventor can reduce the burden of uncertainty of patent
approval by licensing others to use the invention while the pat-
ent application is pending. 78 An inventor who lacks the ability
to develop an invention obviously will wish to license his or her
idea as soon as possible.179 Application licensees assume the
risk that if the patent application is denied they will have made
royalty payments on an unpatentable invention.180 To attract
licensees under such conditions patentees will be forced to of-
fer a reduced royalty rate.'81 According to economic theory,
risk averse patentees should be willing to make such an of-
fer.182 Without application licenses the risk of a long delay
before patent approval might be enough to discourage the re-
search in the first place.
Potential rivals of a patent applicant may wish to develop a
similar invention, but uncertainty about approval of the appli-
cant's patent claim may deter them. If rivals obtain a license
from the applicant with a guarantee of a continued license sub-
sequent to patent approval, they can proceed with develop-
ment. If potential competitors cannot get a license at this
175. See supra text accompanying note 99.
176. See F. SCHERER, supra note 33, at 440 (25% of patent applications are
denied); Banner, American Bar Association Address, 61 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 535,
537 (1979) (Patent and Trademark Office is severely understaffed and un-
derfunded); Baum, The Federal Courts and Patent Validity: An Analysis of the
Record, 56 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 758, 761 (1974) (1648 out of 3666 contested patents
were held valid).
177. W. BOWMAN, supra note 8, at 48.
178. See supra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
179. A delay in licensing delays development by licensees, delays royalty
payments, and diminishes the value of the invention as competing inventions
are introduced.
180. Licensees "will often pay more, or risk paying for a longer time, in the
hope of getting patent protection, instead of merely trade secret disclosure."
Altman, supra note 72, at 317.
181. See supra note 174.
182. See supra notes 168-74 and accompanying text.
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stage, they must gamble. They could proceed with develop-
ment, hoping that the patent will not be approved or that a li-
cense will be obtainable after approval. Alternatively, the
competitors could wait for patent approval before initiating de-
velopment, in which case society loses the benefit of early de-
velopment of a new invention by rivals of the inventor.183
Application licenses protect an inventor from the vicissi-
tudes of the Patent Office, but regrettably a successful patentee
cannot obtain similar protection from the courts. Patents are
frequently challenged by competitors and invalidated by the
courts.184 A study of patent challenges revealed that only 1648
out of a sample of 3666 contested patents were held valid.185
Despite the harsh reality of these statistics, courts continue to
preclude licensing agreements requiring royalty payments after
a patent is declared invalid.186 A preferable approach would be
to allow patent licenses requiring royalty payments on invalid
patents as long as the hazard of protecting invalid patents is
not substantial.187 To obtain such a license, a licensor would
183. See Arnold, Basic Considerations in Licensing, in 1 TECHNOLOGY LI-
CENSING 21 (T. Arnold & T. Smegal eds. 1982) (licensing often decreases the risk
faced by the licensee); Caves, Crookel & Killing, supra note 5, at 16 ("We ex-
pect both licensors and licensees to favor license terms that reduce risks for
them."). This problem is accentuated where patent approval is uncertain and
time-consuming. See F. SCHERER, supra note 33, at 445 ("Development that en-
tails the highest risks tends to be the least rapidly imitated.").
184. P. ROSENBERG, supra note 8, § 17.01, at 17-2 to 17-4. Suits for cancella-
tion, infringement, and declaratory judgement of invalidity call into question
the scope and validity of a patent. Id. at 17-4.
185. Baum, supra note 176, at 761.
186. See, e.g., Grunewald v. Power Swing Partners, 9 Bankr. 512 (Bankr.
S.D. Cal. 1980); supra text accompanying notes 74-76. The licensing agreement
in Grunewald provided that if the patent were ever declared invalid, the mini-
mum annual royalty would be reduced by one-half. 9 Bankr. at 516. The Grune-
wald Court failed to recognize the benefit offered by this type of licensing
agreement--risk sharing. The fact that this type of agreement provides mini-
mal additional incentive to challenge patent validity certainly should not bar a
transaction that effectively reduces the harm caused by uncertainty from pat-
ent litigation. And although the parties who do not have patentable inventions
receive an "undeserved" reward, it is because they were willing to settle for
less than full monopoly profits if litigation ultimately determined their inven-
tion to be worthy of a patent The licensee who must pay royalties after a pat-
ent is invalidated is not being treated unfairly. The risk of patent invalidity is
assumed in order to gain access to an invention. A rational licensee will forego
licensing if the terms of the license are unfavorable and the patent appears
weak. If the patent is strong or the royalties charged by the licensor are mini-
mal, then potential licensees will accept a license; but by hypothesis society
gains little from the Grunewald rule in this case.
187. Such licenses would not allow the patentholder to extend the patent
monopoly. A simplified example will show that the value of royalties collected
under a Grunewald type license would not exceed royalties obtainable in the
present system. Consider a world where ten patents are granted per year, and
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find it necessary to discount the royalty rate on valid patents in
order to entice the licensee to share the risk of a finding of
invalidity.188
Besides patent approval and validity, the development pro-
cess adds another major source of uncertainty. Two-thirds of
industrial investment in innovation "is committed to new prod-
ucts which are either dropped before market introduction or
fail to produce a satisfactory return."189 After a patent is
awarded, a new invention requires an average of five years of
development before it is marketable.190 On average, the cost of
development is ten times the cost of invention.' 91 Thus, most
of the expenditure on R & D is made during this period, al-
though the entrepreneur is uncertain of the value of an inven-
tion until it is marketed. The uncertainty arises because it is
difficult to predict the size of the market, how rapidly the mar-
ket will grow, and the amount potential buyers will be willing
to pay.192
A patentee gains more from licensing if it is done early in
each can be licensed for $500. All ten are licensed, but two are randomly invali-
dated, immediately after licensing. Since no royalties are paid on invalid pat-
ents, society pays the patentees $4,000 on the valid patents. Next, consider a
world identical in all respects, except that royalties are collected on invalid pat-
ents. Patentees cannot continue to collect $500 per patent. In the first world,
licensees paid an expected royalty of $400, since there was an 80% chance of
paying $500 and a 20% chance of paying nothing. The $400 expected royalty
payment was the largest payment the patent monopolists could extract from
the licensees, and is equal to the royalty payment that will prevail in the new
world. Thus society pays $400 to each of the ten patentees at a total cost of
$4,000.
188. See supra note 174.
189. Udell, supra note 11, at 288. Given technical success, the chances of
commercial success are about 40% according to J. PARR, supra note 14, at 60,
and between 10 and 30% according to Scherer, The Economic Effects of Compul-
sory Patent Licensing, 2 FINANCE AND ECONOMICS 18 (Monograph series 1977).
Between 37% and 80% of all new products faiL Udell, supra note 11, at 287.
About 500 new products come on the market each month and 90% of them fail
for lack of interest. U.S. NEWS & WoRLD REP., May 1, 1978, at 45.
190. J. PARKER, supra note 14, at 56 (discussing commercial development of
major innovations during the period 1945-64).
191. J. PARKER, supra note 14, at 51; Schellin, The Innovating Process, 8 AM.
PAT. L.A.Q. 155, 155 (1980). The modal cost of R & D is between $250,000 and
$400,000. F. SCHERER, supra note 33, at 415. Technical feasibility is determined
with a relatively small investment, id. at 416, but significant development costs
are often required to commercialize an invention, Kitch, The Nature and Func-
tion of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & EcoN. 265, 276-77 (1977). See Arnold, supra
note 183, at 33 (the cost of developing the J-59 jumbo jet engine was one-half
billion dollars, and Rolls Royce went banlkupt developing a competitive
engine).
192. See J. WILSON & S. DARR, supra note 5, at 214-16. "A technology's per-
formance is often highly uncertain. The technology may not work properly in
the new location; the demand for the product that embodies it may change;
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the development process. 9 3 If licensees participate in develop-
ment activities, the patentee is relieved of some of the cost and
risk of development, and commercialization is likely to occur
sooner.'9 If there are several potential licensees, they can be
induced to accept early license agreements to ensure that they
do not lag behind their rivals.1 9 5 But early licensing calls for
creative royalty schemes because of the difficulty of valuing an
invention early in the development process.196 Postexpiration
licensing' 97 and package licensing'9 8 satisfy this need.
Justice Harlan, dissenting in Brulotte, argued that pos-
texpiration licensing, rather than resembling illegal tying, was
instead a legal and convenient form of payment for the licen-
sor, and possibly for the licensees. 99 Using this practice, a por-
newer technologies may displace it." Caves, Crookell & Killing, supra note 5, at
3.
193. "Respondents stressed not so much the pecuniary cost saving from li-
censing as the lesser delay and risk involved in getting a diversifying product
on the market through licensing rather than through solo efforts. The time sav-
ing is presumably important in part because the potential licensee's holdings of
complementary assets and skills remain underutilized until the diversifying
product generates a cash flow." Caves, Crookell & Killing, supra note 5, at 11-
12.
194. Id. For a discussion of the cost and risk of the development process,
see supra notes 189-92 and accompanying text.
195. A head start in manufacturing an invention provides a substantial eco-
nomic advantage. See supra note 73.
196. The valuation of an invention at an early stage of development is diffi-
cult because of the high degree of uncertainty about patent validity, the suc-
cess of development, and the response of competitors and customers. See
supra notes 176, 184-85, 189-92 and accompanying text.
"[D]evelopments that entail the highest risk tend to be the least rapidly
imitated." F. ScHERER, supra note 33, at 445. "New technology is more difficult
and costily to transfer ... and presumably places a higher premium on in-
house competence for the licensee. An older product is more fully debugged
and does not demand that the licensee hold a ready stock of complementary
skills." Caves, Crookell & Killing, supra note 5, at 11.
197. See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 82-94 and accompanying text.
199. Justice Harlan used the following hypothetical to illustrate the diffi-
culty in valuing an invention and how postexpiration licensing surmounts the
problem.
At the time when the Thys patent still has a few years to run, a farmer
who has been picking his hops by hand comes into the Thys retail out-
let to inquire about the mechanical pickers. The salesman concludes
his description of the advantages of the Thys machine with the price
tag-$20,000. Value to the farmer depends completely on the use he
will derive from the machine; he is willing to obligate himself on long
credit terms to pay $10,000, but unless the machine can substantially
outpick his old hand-picking methods, it is worth no more to him. He
therefore offers to pay $2,000 down, $400 annually for 20 years, and an
additional payment during the contract term for any production he can
derive from the machine over and above the minimum amount he
could pick by hand. Thys accepts, and by so doing, according to the
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tion of all of the royalty payments could be delayed until the
value of an invention was clear. Furthermore, licensees incur
the greatest costs in the early stages of the development and
marketing of an invention. Thus postexpiration royalty pay-
ments are a means of spreading out. costs over time.200
Like postexpiration licensing, package licensing is also a
means of reducing the effect of uncertainty on both patentees
and licensees. 201 An inventor often secures a number of pat-
ents on related inventions and develops the inventions simulta-
neously.202 The parties may be uncertain about the scope of
patent protection provided by the different patents.203 A pack-
age license surmounts this problem and is therefore an attrac-
tive method of obtaining royalty payments on hard to value
inventions. 0 4
majority, commits a per se misuse of its patent. I cannot believe that
this is good law.
Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 38 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (footnote
omitted).
The courts recognize that package licensing may be convenient for both the
licensor and licensee and permit such licensing subject to the limitations of
Lear and Brulotte, and a test of voluntariness. See supra notes 82-97 and ac-
companying text.
200. Cf. C. LAYrON, supra note 114, at 87 (growth of machine tool company
slowed by development costs until license obtained).
201. See P. ROSENBERG, supra note 8, § 16.02(2).
202. See, e.g., Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S.
827 (1950) (several hundred patents covering radio components).
203. See id. at 833 (the license "was a convenient mode of operation
designed by the parties to avoid the necessity of determining whether each
type of petitioner's product embodies any of the numerous Hazeltine patents").
204. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100,
135, 139-40 (1969) (parties may agree to a provision measuring royalties by the
licensee's total sales, if such a provision is dictated by convenience of the par-
ties even though only some or none of the products employ the patented idea);
Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 834 (1950)
("Sound business judgment could indicate that [royalty payments based on
sales rather than use of a package of patents] represents the most convenient
method of fiing the business value of the privileges granted by the licensing
agreement."); Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Wagner Elec. & Mfg. Co., 225
U.S. 604, 605, 620-22 (1912) (when the infringer, by commingling the elements,
makes it impossible for the patentee to apportion the profits, the entire insepa-
rable profit must be given to the patentee); Western Elec. Co. v. Stewart-
Warner Corp., 631 F.2d 333, 339 (4th Cir. 1980) (a patentee is permitted to base
royalty payments on the sales of a finished product if the patented product is a
component of the finished product not regularly marketed by itself, and if the
arrangement is at the convenience of the parties), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 971
(1981); Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. FMC Corp., 432 F. Supp. 907, 913 (E.D.
Wis. 1977) (where only one feature is patented, but substantially the entire
marketable value of total mechanism is attributable to that feature, recovery is
based on value of the total mechanism), ajfd mem., 588 F.2d 832 (7th Cir. 1978).
"Mandatory package licensing can be a very efficient method of licensing
because it avoids the necessity for numerous separate, time-consuming, and
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Moreover, effective methods of valuing inventions primarily
benefit small entrepreneurs.205 Large firms are less likely than
small firms to license, because they have greater resources to
devote to development and can better shelter themselves from
risk.2O6 Hence, the productive gains accruing to small innova-
tors from risk reducing royalty terms tend to promote competi-
tion in the marketplace.
IV. CONCLUSION
By invoking the spirit of Lear, courts have thwarted at-
tempts by patentees to include royalty terms in their licenses
that discourage patent challenges by licensees. But courts
have been too zealous in their vigil to protect the integrity of
the patent system. Only when prospective licensees lack infor-
mation about an invention that is unpatentable because it lacks
novelty should the doctrine of Lear apply. In other cases, there
will be parties other than licensees with a sufficient incentive
to challenge possibly invalid patents. The royalty provisions
that have been disallowed by the courts could be used to mini-
mize the risk of patent invalidation and infringement, thereby
increasing the incentive to innovate.
A fear that postexpiration licenses and mandatory package
licenses can be used to extend the scope of the patent monop-
costly negotiations between the parties." Andewelt, supra note 95, at 401, 410.
The royalty base is only limited by the creativity of the parties if it is chosen
for mutual convenience as the result of good faith bargaining. Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 138-39 (1969); Arnold, Aspelund,
Brantley & Shurn, supra note 11, at 115. But if coercion is present a royalty
scheme will be invalid. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Allied Chem. Co., 477 F. Supp.
371, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 471 F. Supp.
532, 543-45 (ND. Cal. 1978), afOd in par rev'd in par 648 F.2d 642 (9th Cir.
1981).
205. "[A]s the size of a firm increases, there is a decrease per dollar of R &
D in (a) the number of patented inventions, (b) the percentage of patented in-
ventions used commercially, and (c) the number of significant inventions." J.
ScHmooaER, PATENTs, INVENTION AND EcoNoMIc CHANGE 39 (1972). Small
businesses contribute heavily to the rate of technological innovation. Udell,
supra note 11, at 296.
206. Firms with large R & D programs, or a large number of investment
projects in general, protect themselves from uncertainty by diversifying. See
generally W. NIcHoLsoN, supra note 95, at 156; F. ScHErER, supra note 33, at
414. The principle is the same as in finance. An investor diversifies a portfolio
of assets to reduce risk. W. NICHOLSON, supra note 95, at 157-58. With many
different projects the favorable and unfavorable contingencies "cancel out,"
leaving less risk. F. ScHEREi, supra note 33, at 415. Furthermore, if there are
significant economies of scale, a small firm cannot efficiently produce an inven-
tion. Id. at 414. Also, marketing and distribution are usually more efficient in
large firms, and for a new product this may be critical. Id.
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oly has led courts to proscribe these methods of royalty pay-
ment. Analysis shows that the conditions necessary to expand
monopoly power are not satisfied by these licensing agree-
ments. Thus, the danger of allocative inefficiency posed by
these practices is small, while their benefit in terms of reducing
the burden of risk in the development process is clear.
The courts should reconsider their negative attitude toward
these methods of royalty collection. Allowing patentees more
freedom to license their patents will stimulate R & D and make
the innovative process more efficient.
